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INTRODUCTION
Master limited partnerships (“MLPs”) are little-known entity types
that are growing at a prolific rate in the United States as a result of the
ongoing “shale boom” being experienced in Texas, North Dakota,
Wyoming, and Pennsylvania.1 As of February 1, 2014, there were at least
* J.D. Candidate, University of Pennsylvania Law School, 2015; B.A., Kinesiology, Rice
University, 2008. The author thanks Professor William Bratton for his support and
insightful comments in developing this Comment, as well as Bryn Sappington, Scarlet
McNellie, Matthew DeArman, and Benjamin Ratliff of Norton Rose Fulbright for their
helpful input. He also thanks the members of the University of Pennsylvania Journal of
Business Law for their editorial assistance in preparing this Comment for publication.
Finally, he wishes to thank his lovely wife, Kristen, for her unconditional love and
encouragement.
1. See, e.g., Matthew Rocco, U.S. Shale Boom Drives Record Oil-Related Exports,
FOX BUSINESS (Jan. 9, 2014), http://www.foxbusiness.com/industries/2014/01/09/us-shaleboom-drives-refined-product-exports/ (explaining the positive effect that access to “lowercost crude from shale plays like Eagle Ford in Texas and North Dakota’s Bakken” has had
on domestic refiners and U.S. exports); Ken Silverstein, Shale Gas Boom at ‘Tip of
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127 of these publicly traded energy partnerships with a market
capitalization of about $445 billion.2 Proving this point, as reported by an
October 2013 article in The Economist, MLPs accounted for an astounding
twenty eight percent of the equity raised among listed companies in 2012.3
The article referred to MLPs as one of multiple entity types considered to
be a “distorporation,” or those entities qualifying as pass-throughs for tax
purposes.4
The need for infrastructure growth in the wake of the shale boom and
the accessibility to capital markets which MLPs provide make MLP
governance a hot-button topic. Certainly, the most attractive characteristic
about MLPs to investors is also the most important one for growing the
entities’ asset bases — pass-through taxation. MLPs’ avoidance of entitylevel taxation gives them a competitive advantage over C Corporations in
that they can afford to pay a higher price for acquisitions or may realize
greater net cash flow from an acquisition at the same price due to their
reduced tax burden.5 However, to exploit this advantage, MLPs must have
access to affordable capital.
To summarize, the purpose of this Comment is to answer two
questions: (1) Is the conventional MLP governance structure still the most
appropriate form for publicly-traded energy partnerships in scope of cost of
capital concerns?; and (2) What is the ideal method of keeping MLPs’ cost
of capital competitive such that they remain attractive investment vehicles
for equity investors and maintain their steady growth for pre-existing
interest holders? Considering the foregoing interrogatories, this Comment
Iceberg,’ FORBES (Oct. 30, 2013, 7:55 AM), http://onforb.es/17wPrtd (asserting that the
Marcellus Shale in Pennsylvania “accounts for three-fourths of the growth in the nation’s
production.”).
2. See MLP SCREENER, ALERIAN, http://www.alerian.com/wp-content/uploads/
Energy-MLP-Universe.xls (last visited Mar. 10, 2014) (providing a list of the “Energy
Publicly Traded Partnership Universe” as of February 1, 2014); WELLS FARGO SECURITIES
MLP PRIMER FIFTH EDITION: A GUIDE TO EVERYTHING MLP – OCT. 31, 2013, NAT’L ASS’N
OF
PUBLICLY
TRADED
P’SHIPS,
at
31,
available
at
http://www.naptp.org/documentlinks/Investor_Relations/WF_MLP_Primer_V.pdf
[hereinafter WELLS FARGO MLP PRIMER] (detailing the investment considerations to be
made when considering MLPs).
3. The New American Capitalism: Rise of the Distorporation, THE ECONOMIST, Oct.
26, 2013, at 29 [hereinafter Distorporation] (describing the rise of MLPs, Real Estate
Investment Trusts (REITs), Regulated Investment Companies (RICs), and Business
Development Companies (BDCs) as alternatives to C corporations and these entities’ ability
to channel capital more aptly to wealth-generating assets).
4. See id. (stating that “[T]he American government has in the past restricted the use
of such structures. But these restrictions have eased, and more and more businesses are now
twisting themselves into forms that allow them to qualify as pass-throughs. The corporation
is becoming the distorporation.”).
5. See WELLS FARGO MLP PRIMER, supra note 2, at 23 (discussing the benefits to the
sponsor of creating an MLP).
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will suggest that conventional MLP governance remains the appropriate
form and, finally, that voluntary reduction of Incentive Distribution Rights
(“IDRs”) by the general partner to accommodate capital expenditures or
acquisitions is the optimal method of keeping cost of capital competitive
for growth purposes. In exploring this interrelation between an MLP’s
governance structure and cost of capital, this Comment will also conclude
that the recent forays into alternative entity types, alternative partnership
management, and variable distributions are admirable experiments, but
inadequate substitutes for the “sponsored” MLP model.
The Comment will begin in Part I with an overview of the
conventional MLP model. After providing a brief history of MLPs in Part
I(A), an explanation of conventional MLP formation and structure will
follow in Parts I(B) and I(C), detailing the unique facets of the entity that
affect its cost of capital. In Part II, this Comment will build upon the MLP
framework described in Part I by analyzing the cost of capital implications
that stem from conventional MLP governance. This analysis will begin in
Part II(A) with an examination of incentive distribution rights (“IDRs”) and
their effect on cost of capital.6 Then, the Comment’s focus will turn in Part
II(B) to the ability of the conventional MLP model to adapt to rising cost of
capital, often caused by “high splits” in the IDRs.7 Part II(C) will argue
that contractual methods of addressing cost of capital concerns are
appropriate. This portion of the Comment will also serve as a review of the
theory of “uncorporation” promulgated by alternative-entity supporter and
noted “contractarian” Larry Ribstein.8
I.

CONVENTIONAL MLP GOVERNANCE

A master limited partnership (“MLP”) is a limited partnership whose
limited partnership interests are publicly-traded and referred to as

6. For an explanation of IDRs, see infra notes 50–66 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 64–66 and accompanying text (defining high splits).
8. See, e.g., Larry Ribstein, The Uncorporation’s Domain, 55 VILL. L. REV. 125
(2010) [hereinafter Ribstein, Uncorporation] (describing the ongoing competition between
corporations and “uncorporate” business forms such as partnerships, limited partnerships,
and limited liability companies, and the businesses appropriate for “uncorporate” form);
Larry Ribstein, Partnership Governance of Large Firms, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 289 (2009)
[hereinafter Ribstein, Partnership Governance] (examining private equity firms among
other “uncorporate” structures and how these entities align the interests of interest holders
with management); Larry Ribstein, Fiduciary Duties and Limited Partnership Agreements,
37 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 927 (2004) (discussing the restrictions on fiduciary duties waivers in
limited partnership agreements of the Uniform Limited Partnership Act); Larry Ribstein, An
Applied Theory of Limited Partnership, 37 EMORY L.J. 835 (1988) (asserting the economic
benefits of organization as a limited partnership and the appropriateness of a different
method of taxation for partnerships versus C corporations).
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“common units,” which are analogous to common stock in C corporations.9
The major difference, however, is that C corporations are subject to
“double taxation” by which the entity pays corporate taxes and the
stockholders pay taxes on dividends, whereas MLPs are exempt from
entity-level taxation and, as result, pass on all deductions along with the
taxable income allocable to each unitholder.10 It is this characteristic that
makes holding MLPs attractive to investors, especially those seeking to
hold assets with high yields and high growth, but capable of shielding them
from a yearly tax burden.11
A. Origins
MLPs emerged in the early 1980s, coinciding with the end of
widespread conglomeration and the advent of the leveraged buyout and
bust-up of the mid-1980s.12 It is widely believed that the first MLP came
about in 1981 when Apache Petroleum Corporation combined thirty
drilling and exploration limited partnerships into one “master” limited
partnership.13 To consummate the transaction, each of the individual
limited partnerships contributed all of their interests into the MLP in
exchange for limited partnership interests in the MLP — also called a “roll
up.”14 Nowadays, MLPs are typically formed through either “rollout” or
“acquisition” transactions.15
Though in the beginning MLPs primarily held oil and gas assets, by
1987 nationally known brands like Burger King and the Boston Celtics had
reorganized as MLPs, providing the impetus for legislative change.16 The
Revenue Act of 198717 was a major lawmaking development that limited
the entity-level taxation exemption to only those publicly traded
9. See John Goodgame, Master Limited Partnership Governance, 60 BUS. LAW. 471,
471 (2005) (providing a definitional overview of MLPs).
10. Id. at 472.
11. Id. at 474.
12. See Donna D. Adler, Master Limited Partnerships, 40 U. FLA. L. REV. 755, 756–57
(1988) (describing the origin of MLPs and the types of transactions that create MLPs).
13. Id.; see also J.T. Carpenter, Comment, Master Limited Partnerships Shed a Tier,
53 S. TEX. L. REV. 381, 383 (2011) (describing the origins of MLPs and the phenomenon of
MLPs’ limited partners acquiring the general partner as part of a “GP tuck-in” transaction).
14. Adler, supra note 12, at 756–57.
15. A rollout describes a transaction in which the corporate sponsor contributes assets
to a limited partnership in exchange for partnership interests that it sells into the market. Id.
at 757. Similarly, in an acquisition transaction, the corporate sponsor serves as the general
partner and sells limited partnership interests to the public. Id. With the equity raised, the
partnership then purchases assets from either the sponsor or a third party. Id.
16. Id. at 757–58.
17. Revenue Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, 101 Stat. 1330 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
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partnerships for which ninety percent or greater of their income represented
“qualifying income.”18 Importantly, qualifying income includes “income
and gains derived from the exploration, development, mining or
production, processing, refining, transportation (including pipelines
transporting gas, oil, or products thereof), or the marketing of any mineral
or natural resource (including fertilizer, geothermal energy, and timber)”
and income realized by sale or rents of real property.19 It is for this reason
that the bulk of MLPs traded publicly today are in some way related to
natural resources.
B. Structuring the Entity: Organization & Offering
Like a limited partnership, an MLP usually has a general partner, often
owned by a corporation or limited liability company (LLC), and numerous
limited partners — also known as unit-holders.20 The following structural
description has been referred to as the “sponsored MLP model” by at least
one practitioner.21 In this model, the “sponsor” of the MLP organizes the
limited partnership, almost invariably in Delaware,22 and serves as the
general partner, retaining at most a two-percent ownership interest in the
MLP.23 In many cases, the sponsor is a publicly traded corporation
operating in the oil and gas space, namely exploration and production
(“E&P”). The “sponsor” may hold the general partnership interests itself

18. See I.R.C. § 7704(d) (2006 & Supp. II 2008) (defining qualifying income); see also
I.R.C. § 7704(c)(2) (2006 & Supp. II 2008) (stipulating that a publicly traded partnership
“meets the gross income requirements of this paragraph for any taxable year if 90 percent or
more of the gross income of such partnership for such taxable year consists of qualifying
income” and will be exempted from entity-level taxation); Goodgame, supra note 9, at 472
(explaining qualifying income and providing an example of the effect of exemption from
entity-level taxation).
19. I.R.C. § 7704(d)(1)(C)–(E) (2006 & Supp. II 2008). “Mineral or natural resource”
in the context of I.R.C. § 7704(d)(1)(E) is defined as “any product of a character with
respect to which a deduction for depletion is allowable under section 611.” I.R.C. §
7704(d)(1)(G) (2006 & Supp. II 2008). These products include those extracted from
“mines, oil and gas wells, other natural deposits, and timber.” I.R.C. § 611(a) (2006).
20. See Philip H. Peacock, Master Limited Partnerships: At The Crossroads?, 4 TEX. J.
OIL GAS & ENERGY L. 397, 400 (2008) (detailing the formation and structure of MLPs);
Goodgame, supra note 9 at 473.
21. See John Goodgame, New Developments in Master Limited Partnership
Governance, 68 BUS. LAW. 81, 83 (2012) (defining the traditional governance model of
MLPs as the “sponsored MLP model”).
22. See Peacock, supra note 20, at 398 (explaining that “MLPs are typically organized
in Delaware because Delaware has a very flexible limited partnership statute that, among
other things, provides that the liability of the general partner to the limited partners may be
limited by contract.”).
23. Id. at 400; Goodgame, supra note 9, at 473.
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or through a special purpose entity with few assets.24
Oftentimes the sponsor contributes the initial assets to the MLP25, and
then sells the common units (i.e., limited partnership interests) into the
market through an initial public offering — a “rollout” transaction.26 Such
a transaction may also be referred to as a “dropdown,” which better
describes the transaction from the sponsor’s point of view.27 Figure 1
illustrates a structural depiction of a dropdown transaction, below. This
transactional setup involves a Master Contribution Agreement between the
sponsor-parent and the MLP detailing the assets being sold, the
consideration, and the method of financing the consideration. In the case
of a midstream dropdown (i.e., a pipeline), the sponsor-parent will almost
invariably still need the use of the assets for transporting its E&P
extractions. Recognizing this, the MLP bonds the sponsor’s use of the
pipeline under a through-put agreement, typically twenty years in duration
or longer, requiring the sponsor to send a minimum amount of extracted
product through the pipeline over the life of the agreement. This throughput agreement serves as assurance to the MLP and its unitholders that the
recently-acquired midstream asset will continue to generate significant
revenue sufficient to justify the price paid and increase investor
distributions in the short- and long-term.

24.
25.
26.
27.

Goodgame, supra note 9, at 473–74.
Peacock, supra note 20, at 400.
See supra note 15 and accompanying text (defining a rollout transaction).
Peacock, supra note 20 at 409.

MCCABE_FINAL (ARTICLE 7).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

1/15/2015 4:56 PM

MLPS’ COST OF CAPITAL CONUNDRUM

325

FIGURE 1: THE MECHANICS OF A DROPDOWN TRANSACTION28

As the sponsor, the modus operandus for creating an MLP is primarily
to monetize assets. A “sale” to an MLP generates cash for reinvestment in
the sponsor’s other projects that may not constitute “qualifying income” or
that may yield a higher return, and the sponsor receives a premium price
for its asset because the MLP is not taxed at the entity level.29 A beneficial
dropdown transaction unlocks the greater value of assets generating
qualifying income by transferring them to an MLP because the MLP can
pay more for the asset since the cash flows it is buying the asset for will
only be taxed once, namely not at the entity level. If a new MLP is created,
the consideration for the assets is partnership interests, which are converted
into cash when some of the units are marketed to the public through an
IPO.30 In the case of a pre-existing MLP, the sponsor may transfer the
assets in exchange for cash secured from the capital markets by the MLP
through debt and equity offerings.31
At this point, it is important to tease out the reasoning behind why
sponsors form MLPs in the first place. Aside from the obvious motive of
monetizing assets, an MLP can quite clearly function as a funding
mechanism for the sponsor. The sponsor is potentially able to avoid an
equity offering of its own by monetizing “qualifying income” assets
28. See Figure of How Dropdowns Work, SEEKING ALPHA, http://static.cdnseekingalpha.com/uploads/2014/3/13/20371061-13947623576515193-MLPData.jpg
(last
visited Oct. 14, 2014) (utilizing diagram created by Morgan Stanley Research to explain the
basics of a dropdown).
29. See Carpenter, supra note 13, at 388 (asserting the reasons why sponsors choose to
create MLPs).
30. Peacock, supra note 20, at 409–10.
31. Id.; see supra Fig. 1 (depicting this transaction).
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through a dropdown transaction. In doing so, it finances its own NPVpositive projects at a cost of capital it otherwise could not access through
the capital markets. As an added benefit, the sponsor continues to receive
cash flow from the dropped-down assets thanks to its ownership of the
general partner, and in turn the incentive distribution rights, which in some
cases can send 20% of the MLP’s cash flow to the sponsor.32 Alternatively,
if the sponsor does not have any NPV-positive investments, it can use the
cash generated by the dropdown to buy back stock at a lower cost of capital
than if it utilized retained earnings, thereby driving up return on equity. In
any event, it is clear that sponsors can use MLPs as both a steady source of
income (e.g., IDRs) and a financing arm.
The power of the general partner in an MLP is one of the most
defining characteristics of “sponsored MLP” governance and differs
dramatically from traditional management control in a corporation.33
Limited partners have no role in the operations and management of the
MLP. Though the MLP may have a board of directors, the directors are
merely place-fillers since they are generally directors of the general partner
appointed by the MLP’s sponsor.34 Because the sponsor often has a vested
interest in maintaining control over the assets it contributes to an MLP, it is
averse to allowing a third party to control the assets.35 For example, a
sponsor in the oil and gas exploration business may contribute a pipeline to
an MLP at the time of organization. However, because the sponsor relies
upon the pipeline to transport the product it extracts, it is in its best interest
to maintain control over it so as to take advantage of synergies and prevent
competition between itself and the MLP.36
The sponsored MLP is entirely owned by the parent-sponsor until
the IPO of the common units.37 Furthermore, the MLP typically does not
directly own assets, but rather serves as a holding company for subsidiary
LLCs, which own the assets.38 On the IPO date, the parent-sponsor
commonly sells less than a quarter of the common units into the market,
intentionally retaining the remainder.39
Stockholders in corporations and unitholders in MLPs have similar
voting rights. For MLP unitholders, these rights are often limited to
32. See infra notes 57–72 and accompanying text (detailing the IDR mechanism); see
also infra note 71 and accompanying text (discussing MLPs in the high splits).
33. Peacock, supra note 20, at 400 (“The general partner of an MLP has exclusive
control over the operations and activities of the MLP.”); see Goodgame, supra note 9, at 491
(opining on the exclusion of the common unitholders from MLP decision-making).
34. Goodgame, supra note 9, at 491.
35. Peacock, supra note 20, at 400.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 401.
39. Id.
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removal of the general partner, merger or consolidation of the MLP, sale of
all or substantially all of the assets, dissolution, and actions prohibited by
the partnership agreement.40 Though these rights seem ostensibly similar to
shareholder voting rights under Delaware General Corporate Law, they are
illusory because MLPs are controlled by their general partners/sponsors,
who typically hold a control block, allowing them to forgo annual meetings
and to merely appoint the board.41 Thus, one practitioner has suggested
that the only “rational action that a dissatisfied unitholder can take is to
vote with her wallet and sell her common units.”42
C. Distinguishing Features of MLPs
With the foregoing simple explanation of the “sponsored MLP”
structure, MLPs become complicated with the introduction of four
distinguishing features of MLPs: (1) minimum quarterly distributions and
obligation to distribute all “available cash”; (2) subordinated units; (3)
incentive distribution rights (“IDRs”); and (4) uniquely favorable tax
treatment.
Whereas dividend declarations or retentions are matters of board
discretion in corporations, MLPs are constrained by a kind of dividend
preference. Common unitholders have an expectation of receiving a
quarterly distribution, dubbed the “minimum quarterly distribution.”43 This
amount is stipulated in the partnership agreement and must be paid to the
common unitholders before any distribution is made to the units retained by
the sponsor.44 Further, if for any reason the minimum quarterly distribution
is not distributed in full to the common unitholders in a given quarter, the
arrearage must be paid in addition to the minimum quarterly distribution in
the successive quarter(s) until the common units are made whole.45 This
provision ties in with the concept of subordinated units (i.e., the sponsor’s

40. See Goodgame, supra note 9, at 491–93 (examining the partnership agreement of
Enbridge LP to determine the voting rights of limited partners).
41. Id. at 493.
42. Id.
43. Peacock, supra note 20, at 402.
44. Id.; see PHILLIPS 66 PARTNERS LP PROSPECTUS (FORM 424B4) A-11 (2013)
[hereinafter PHILLIPS 66 PROSPECTUS] (defining “Minimum Quarterly Distribution” as
“$0.2125 per Unit per Quarter” in the First Amended and Restated Agreement of Limited
Partnerships disclosed in connection with the MLP’s offering of 16,425,000 common units).
45. See Goodgame, supra note 9, at 476 (detailing a similar provision in Enterprise
Product Partners, LP’s partnership agreement); see also PHILLIPS 66 PROSPECTUS, supra note
44, at A-46 (stipulating in Section 6.4(a)(ii) that “cumulative common unit arrearage[s]”
must be paid to the unitholders “less the General Partner’s Percentage Interest” after the
unitholders have received that quarter’s Minimum Quarterly Distribution).
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retained units are junior to the publicly held units for a time).46 It is
believed that minimum quarterly distributions were created in response to
underwriters’ desire to increase the marketability of MLP common units.47
Over the early life of an MLP after its IPO, the partnership
agreement provides for favorable treatment of the common units held by
the public as compared with those held by the sponsor. As noted earlier,
the sponsor typically retains a majority of the limited partner interests (i.e.,
common units) after an IPO.48 However, in order to assure equity investors
of the minimum quarterly distribution, sponsors have traditionally provided
for a “preference” or “subordination” period in the partnership agreement
to ensure a minimum yield for these initial investors.49 During this
subordination period, which typically lasts three years,50 the subordinated
units held privately “are not entitled to receive any cash distributions unless
and until the common units have been paid the minimum quarterly
distribution in full, and any arrearages in the payment of the minimum
quarterly distribution to the common units have been eliminated.”51
Furthermore, during this period, it is common to limit the amount of
additional equity that the MLP can issue, especially securities senior to the
common units.52 The subordinated units are converted into common units
following the subordination period.53
These minimum quarterly distributions are to come from the MLP's
“available cash.”54 Most MLPs require distribution of all available cash to

46. See infra notes 47–52 and accompanying text (discussing subordinated units).
47. Carpenter, supra note 13, at 385.
48. See supra note 39 and accompanying text (stating that sponsors typically sell less
than a quarter of the common units in an IPO).
49. See Goodgame, supra note 9, at 476 (describing the subordination period as a time
when the publicly held common units are given a preferred return to those held by the
sponsor).
50. Peacock, supra note 20, at 406; see PHILLIPS 66 PROSPECTUS, supra note 44, at 62
(setting forth a subordination period extending from the closing date of the offering to
September 30, 2016, which is a term of approximately three years).
51. Peacock, supra note 20, at 406.
52. See Goodgame, supra note 9, at 477 (listing the “additional” restrictions protecting
the yield of the common units during the subordination period).
53. Peacock, supra note 20, at 406.
54. See id. at 402 (simplifying available cash to mean “cash flow less reserves
established at the discretion of the general partner for items such as capital expenditures,
operating expenditures (including debt service), and distributions to be made in the
future.”); see also PHILLIPS 66 PROSPECTUS, supra note 44, at A-3 (defining “Available
Cash” as “the sum of . . . all cash and cash equivalents of the Partnership Group . . . on hand
at the end of such Quarter [and] . . . all or any portion of additional cash and cash
equivalents . . . resulting from Working Capital Borrowings . . . less . . . the amount of any
cash reserves established by the General Partner”).
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the partners on a quarterly basis.55 Though the general partner has
discretion to develop cash reserves for targeted purposes, it is in the general
partner’s best interest to distribute as much cash as possible to the common
unitholders due to its holding of IDRs.56
IDRs are easily the most unique facet of MLPs, notwithstanding
their tax-favored status, and arguably have the greatest implications for cost
of capital. IDRs “are a special class of limited partnership interest that
entitle the holder to an increasing percentage of the cash distributions that
the MLP pays out to its unitholders as [certain] thresholds are met.”57 They
serve the purpose of aligning the interest of the general partner, which
typically holds the IDRs, with those of the limited partners (i.e., common
unitholders).58 This structure encourages the MLP to maintain a high
distribution and incentivizes the general partner to steadily increase the
distribution by appealing to its self-interest.59 For example, in the case of
Phillips 66 Partners LP, which went public in July 2013,60 the partnership
agreement stipulates an initial minimum quarterly distribution
($0.2125/unit per quarter)61 and then three “target distributions,” which,
when reached, provide greater shares of the distributions of available cash
to the general partner as part of the IDRs. 62 The “First Target Distribution”
is $0.244375/unit per quarter,63 at which point the general partner will
receive 15% of the total distribution to the common units exceeding
$0.244375/unit.64 The “Second Target Distribution” is $0.265625/unit per
quarter,65 at which point the general partner will receive 25% of the total
distribution to the common units exceeding $0.265625/unit.66 The “Third
55. Carpenter, supra note 13, at 385; Peacock, supra note 20, at 402; see PHILLIPS 66
PROSPECTUS, supra note 44, at A-45–A-46 (“Within 45 days following the end of each
Quarter . . . an amount equal to 100% of Available Cash with respect to such Quarter shall
be distributed . . . by the Partnership to the Partners as of the Record Date selected by the
General Partner.”).
56. See infra notes 57–72 and accompanying text (discussing IDRs).
57. Peacock, supra note 20, at 403.
58. Carpenter, supra note 13, at 387.
59. See Goodgame, supra note 9, at 477–78 (calling IDRs the “most powerful . . .
incentive for the general partner contained in MLP partnership agreements”).
60. See Company Overview, PHILLIPS 66 CO., http://www.phillips66.com/EN/
about/Company_Overview/Pages/index.aspx [hereinafter Phillips 66] (referencing the
MLP’s July 2013 IPO containing primarily midstream assets).
61. See supra note 44 (providing the minimum distribution required according to the
partnership agreement).
62. See PHILLIPS 66 PROSPECTUS, supra note 44, at A-46–48 (stating the proper
“distributions of available cash from operating surplus.”).
63. Id. at A-8.
64. Id. at 64–65, A-47.
65. Id. at A-17.
66. Id. at 64–65, A-47.
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Target Distribution” is $0.318750/unit per quarter,67 at which point the
general partner will receive 50% of the total distribution to the common
units exceeding $0.318750/unit.68 Table 1, below, from Phillips 66
Partners LP’s Prospectus provides a breakdown of cash distributions under
this IDR scheme.
TABLE 1: IDR DISTRIBUTION BREAKDOWN69
UNITHOLDERS

Minimum Quarterly
Distribution
First Target
Distribution
Second Target
Distribution
Third Target
Distribution
Thereafter

GENERAL PARTNER

$0.2125

MARGINAL PERCENTAGE
INTEREST IN DISTRIBUTIONS

98%

2%

up to $0.244375

98%

2%

above $0.244375 up to $0.265625

85%

15%

above $0.265625 up to $0.318750

75%

25%

above $0.318750

50%

50%

above $0.2125

When distributions reach the point where 50% of any additional
cash distributed accrues to the general partner under the partnership’s IDR
provision, an MLP is said to be in the “high splits.”70 It is when an MLP
reaches the high splits that it becomes more difficult to find projects that
are accretive —those projects that will increase the distribution to
unitholders — because it must find projects and acquisitions that generate
twice as much cash flow as the MLP intends to distribute to its unitholders
as a result of the 50/50 split.71 For example, if the MLP wants to increase
distributions by $0.25 to unitholders, its acquisition must be capable of
producing additional cash flow of $0.50/unit, since half of the cash flow
will be directed to the general partner under the 50/50 IDR split. To
address this concern, this Comment will argue in Part II(B) that an IDR

67. Id. at A-18.
68. Id. at 64–65, A-47.
69. Id. at 65.
70. Peacock, supra note 20, at 404.
71. See id. at 405 (commenting that the high splits of an MLP may actually stunt the
growth of the entity because public investors are unwilling to purchase the common units
offered in an equity offering unless the project or acquisition contemplated will be accretive
to investors in the long run). This has obvious implications on the cost of capital and the
permissible capital expenditures that an MLP can make when in the high splits. See infra
Parts II(A)–(B) (explaining IDRs’ effect on cost of capital and methods of remedying the
problem created).
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reset provision in the partnership agreement is a vital and modest corrective
for high splits’ effect on cost of capital.72
Finally, the tax benefits of MLPs as pass-through entities accrue
especially to unitholders by enhancing distributions to its partners and
shielding the majority of distributions from taxes in the short-term.
Moreover, as referenced in Part I, preferential tax treatment allows the
MLP to be more competitive in pursuing acquisitions and projects.73 The
MLP’s avoidance of entity-level taxation, 35% in the case of corporations,
allows it to distribute significantly more to its partners.74 This steady return
may be particularly attractive to investors who are interested in holding the
units for a long period of time and are seeking a high income relative to the
price of the unit (i.e., high yield).75
High yields emanate from MLPs’ ability to shield a large portion of
their yields from taxes. As a pass-through, MLPs pass each partner “their
allocable share of the partnership’s income, gains, losses, and deductions,
including accelerated depreciation and amortization deductions in
computing their federal income tax liability.”76 These distributions to
partners are generally not taxable, but are rather treated as returns of
capital, which reduce the common unitholders cost basis in the MLP.77 The
only portion of the cash distribution on which unitholders will be taxed
concurrently is the “taxable income allocable” from the MLP — the portion
of the distribution attributable to the MLP’s net income. 78 It is estimated
that the ratio of taxable income to distributions is approximately 20%.79 In
other words, the unitholder would pay tax at their marginal rate on 20% of
the total distribution, while deferring payment of taxes on 80% of the
distribution until the occurrence of a triggering event (e.g., sale of the units)

72. See infra Part II(B) (explaining the mechanics of an IDR reset provision and its
effect on cost of capital).
73. See supra note 5 and accompanying text (referencing MLPs’ competitive
advantage over C corporations).
74. See Goodgame, supra note 9, at 472 (providing an example of the effect of “double
taxation” by equating $1.54 of MLP income to $2.20 of corporate income in order to
provide $1 of after-tax income to an equity holder with a marginal tax rate of 35%);
Peacock, supra note 20, at 407.
75. Goodgame, supra note 9, at 474.
76. WELLS FARGO MLP PRIMER, supra note 2, at 37.
77. See id. (contrasting distribution from MLP with distribution from a C corporation
that is treated as a dividend and does not affect basis).
78. Id.; see also Goodgame, supra note 9, at 472 (noting the deferral of income taxes
for unitholders flowing from the return of capital).
79. WELLS FARGO MLP PRIMER, supra note 2, at 37; see also Peacock, supra note 20,
at 408 (stating that many MLPs estimate the amount of allocable income to partners as 20%
or less when they go public).
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to the extent the unitholder’s adjusted basis exceeds the non-taxable
distribution amount.80
D. Fiduciary Duties
Whereas broad fiduciary duties are considered the bedrock of
Delaware corporate law, they are often explicitly excluded from alternative
entities like MLPs.81 Since August 1, 2004, the Delaware Revised Uniform
Limited Partnership Act (“DRULPA”) has permitted the expansion,
restriction or elimination of fiduciary duties.82 The relevant section of the
DRULPA, section 17-1101(d), states:
To the extent that, at law or in equity, a partner or other
person has duties (including fiduciary duties) to a limited
partnership or to another partner or to another person that
is a party to or is otherwise bound by a partnership
agreement, the partner’s or other person’s duties may be
expanded or restricted or eliminated by provisions in the
partnership agreement; provided that the partnership
agreement may not eliminate the implied contractual
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.83
Amongst MLPs, the elimination of fiduciary duties has become a common
practice.84 In a September 2012 study of eighty-six “publicly traded noncorporate business associations” (LLCs and LPs), it was found that over

80. WELLS FARGO MLP PRIMER, supra note 2, at 37.
81. See generally Goodgame, supra note 9, at 485-87 (describing the divergence
between the Delaware General Corporate Law and the Delaware Revised Uniform Limited
Partnership Act).
82. See id. at 487 n.87 (reasoning that the Delaware legislature possibly amended the
provision to add terminology permitting elimination of fiduciary duties in response to
dictum in Gotham Partners v. Hallwood Realty Partners, 817 A.2d 160, 167–68 (Del.
2002), which concluded that a limited partnership agreement could not eliminate fiduciary
duties because the statute lacked the word “eliminate”).
83. Delaware Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 171101(d) (2010).
84. See generally Brent J. Horton, The Going-Private Freeze-Out: A Unique Danger
for Investors in Delaware Non-Corporate Business Associations, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 53
(2013) (examining the provisions of LLC operating agreements and LP agreements for
publicly traded entities that stipulate special approval provisions for dealing with conflicts
or eliminate fiduciary duties); Mohsen Manesh, Contractual Freedom Under Delaware
Alternative Entity Law: Evidence from Publicly Traded LPs and LLCs, 37 J. CORP. L. 555
(2012) (discussing the widespread use of fiduciary duty waiver and exculpation provisions
among alternative entities and the justifications for such contractual provisions).
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fifty-two percent eliminate fiduciary duties entirely.85 Similarly, a June
2011 study of eighty-five publicly traded firms determined that only ten
(11.76%) of the firms do not substantially alter default fiduciary duties —
forty-two (49.41%) “fully waive the fiduciary duties of the firm’s
managers,” while another thirty-three (38.82%) firms eliminate liability
stemming from breach of fiduciary duties (88.24% cumulatively).86
Eliminating fiduciary duties in MLPs makes sense for the
unitholders to the extent that both management and unitholders interests
can be aligned economically through contract — a “contractarian”
viewpoint, which will be revisited in Part II(C).87 It is alleged that the
incentives and framework established contractually in the partnership
agreement can adequately supplant fiduciary duties and, in doing so,
constrain agency costs that arise from enforcement by “derivative plaintiffs
and their lawyers who, like corporate managers, may have interests
different from those of the owners.”88 The two contractual provisions of
MLPs that serve to support this assertion are the minimum quarterly
distributions and the IDRs. In the case of minimum quarterly distributions,
managerial discretion is curbed with regards to retaining cash flow due to
mandatory distribution of “available cash.”89
Similarly, the IDRs
incentivize the general partner to maximize distributions, which inure to the
benefit of the limited partners and the general partner, and “likely promote
proper management of the MLP and its assets.”90 The contrary viewpoint
on IDRs is that such an incentive-based contract may encourage the general
partner to increase distributions aggressively, ignoring earnings retention,
to the detriment of long-term value.91 Alternatively, it can be argued that
the general partner gets a disproportionate percentage of firm profits not
commensurate with its ownership stake, which encourages excessive risk.92
This Comment will maintain in Part II that the contractual
provisions allowing MLPs to engage in ostensibly interested transactions
with its sponsor through further dropdowns of assets generating “qualifying
income,” though questionable under traditional conceptions of the duty of
85. See Horton, supra note 84, at 94 (finding that 29.41% of LLCs and 57.97% of LPs
that are publicly traded feature these elimination provisions).
86. Manesh, supra note 84, at 574.
87. See infra Part II(C) (explaining in greater depth the theory of uncorporation and its
applicability to MLPs). See generally supra note 8 (referencing the works of noted
contractarian Larry Ribstein).
88. Ribstein, Partnership Governance, supra note 8, at 297.
89. Id. at 290–91. But see Manesh, supra note 84, at 590 (asserting that “the
disciplinary effects of compelled distributions are dubious given the fact that the managers
are contractually entitled to determine what constitutes ‘available cash.’”).
90. Goodgame, supra note 9, at 479.
91. Manesh, supra note 84, at 591.
92. Id.
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loyalty, is an important tool in maintaining a competitive cost of capital for
the firm. As such, Part II will argue that the “sponsored MLP model”
remains the entity of choice for cost of capital purposes despite the recent
experiments with LLCs and GP tuck-ins.
II.

COST OF CAPITAL IN CONVENTIONAL MLPS

Because the attractiveness of MLPs to investors depends heavily
upon their maintaining and growing distributions to investors, it is
paramount that the MLPs have access to capital markets or, at the least, a
sponsor with a plethora of “qualifying income” assets that can be “dropped
down” to the MLP.93 Intuitively, in order for investors to contribute this
capital, the contemplated transaction must cost less than the expected return
— in other words, the rate of return must exceed the MLP’s cost of capital
to be an accretive investment.94 The likelihood of an “acceptable return” is
heavily determinative of the cost of capital (i.e., the price equity investors
are willing to pay and the interest rate at which capital is lent).95 Another
significant facet of MLPs that necessitates keeping the cost of capital low is
the fact that many of them own “steady cash flow” assets — midstream
assets like pipelines — making it unlikely that the rate of return on the
acquisition, albeit reliable, would permit an inflated cost of capital.96
Whereas MLPs undoubtedly benefit from their pass-through status
for cost of capital purposes, it is clear that when the IDRs reach the high
splits (i.e., 50% of increased cash flow accruing to the sponsor/general
partner), this cost of capital advantage over C corporations can disappear.97
As such, in the past five years, existing and newly-formed MLPs have tried
many alternatives to mitigate this apparent roadblock to growth inherent in
the “sponsored MLP model” of governance.98 However, it remains to be
seen whether the use of alternative entity types has remedied this issue. If
the past two years are any indication, the “sponsored MLP model,”
complete with high-splits IDRs, remains the governance model of choice,
proving that “the value inherent in owning IDRs appears to outweigh the

93. See Goodgame, supra note 9, at 501–02 (concluding that “the MLP structure
encourages the general partner to cause the MLP to finance its growth at least in part
through the raising of capital.”). See generally supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text
(defining “drop-down” transactions).
94. Goodgame, supra note 9, at 502; see WELLS FARGO MLP PRIMER, supra note 2, at
28 (commenting that MLPs have typically enjoyed favorable access to capital markets).
95. Goodgame, supra note 9, at 502.
96. Id.
97. See WELLS FARGO MLP PRIMER, supra note 2, at 104–06 (discussing Wells Fargo’s
method of estimating an MLP’s cost of capital).
98. See id. at 98 (discussing rationales for differing MLP governance structures).
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challenges of a higher cost of equity for GP owners.”99 This Comment
reaches the same conclusion in this Part and argues that a contractual
provision allowing the general partner to reset the IDRs is a most
appropriate method of reducing an MLP’s cost of capital.
A. Effect of Incentive Distribution Rights on Cost of Capital
According to Wells Fargo’s analysis as of the 2nd Quarter of 2013,
there were twelve MLPs paying 20% or more of their total cash to their
general partner,100 arguably due to their IDRs reaching the 50/50 high-splits
threshold. This increased burden has been termed the “GP tax” and is a
serious impediment to the long-term growth prospects of the MLP.101 As
one author has put it, with an increasing cost of capital and investors'
enduring desire for greater distributions, “there inevitably comes a moment
when the two competing realities . . . intersect.”102 This intersection is the
high splits of IDRs.
In determining the cost of equity for an MLP, Wells Fargo has
advocated for a calculation that sums: (1) the forward yield adjusted for
the general partner’s share of cash flow over the common units’ percentage
of cash flow, and (2) distribution growth.103 By Wells Fargo’s calculations,
an MLP without IDRs can make investments at eleven to twelve times
earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (“EBITDA”)
and still have an asset accretive to the MLP (i.e., an investment which
increases distributions to unitholders).104 By contrast, an MLP with a
maximum IDR tier of 50% with the same assumptions would only be able
to pay seven to eight times EBITDA in order to ensure that the investment
remains accretive over its lifetime.105 Assuming an initial cost of equity
capital (rate of return) of 10% (7% forward yield + 3% distribution
growth), charting the growth of the cost of equity as a function of the
increased cash flow to the general partner, an MLP’s required rate of return
will approximately double as it reaches the high splits (50% IDR). 106 As a
99. See id. (noting that as of October 31, 2013, nineteen of the twenty-four MLPs that
had completed IPOs since 2012 included a maximum IDR in their structure, with all
midstream MLP IPOs including a 50% IDR tier).
100. Id. at 97.
101. Id.
102. Carpenter, supra note 13, at 413.
103. See WELLS FARGO MLB PRIMER, supra note 2, at 104 (calculating the forward
adjusted cash yield as the next four quarterly distributions, divided by the current unit price,
and adjusted for the general partner’s share of cash flow).
104. See id. at 105 & Ex. 105 (assuming a yield of 7%, a cost of debt of 7%, and
distribution growth of 3%).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 105–106 & Ex.106.
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result, if the MLP wishes to fund an acquisition with new equity, the
acquired investment must generate cash flow “at least double the aggregate
current distribution rate on those newly-issued common units” in order to
be accretive to the new equity investors.107
B. Combating Rising Cost of Capital
Tactics to combat the rising cost of capital stemming from IDRs
seemingly fall into two categories. The first calls for the elimination of
IDRs through one of the following methods: (1) the use of another entity
type (e.g., an LLC) to go public; (2) a “GP tuck-in” transaction; (3) a
variable distributions provision; or (4) the unilateral elimination of IDRs by
the general partner. The other side of the coin contemplates the
maintenance of IDRs and includes: (1) general partner subsidies through
temporary suspension of IDRs; (2) maximum IDR splits of 25% rather than
50%; or (3) an IDR reset option.
Action precipitating from cost of capital concerns with the
“sponsored MLP model” first arose in the early 2000s, possibly in response
to Enron.108 Needless to say, the collapse of Enron led to significant
discussion and scholarship over incentive structures and pitfalls of modern
corporate governance.109 In the context of MLPs, a push was made for
“good governance” as determined by market pressures.110 The first step
taken by a few MLPs towards this supposed “market optimal governance”
involved the unveiling of the “public LLC model.”111 Under this structure,
the LLC would not have a managing member, but would be managed by a
board of directors elected by the unitholders, which would owe fiduciary
duties like those owed by directors and officers in Delaware
corporations.112
As with corporations, these LLCs often contain
exculpatory provisions from duty of care violations, but the duty of loyalty
remains intact.113 Furthermore, the operating agreement of the LLC would
107. Goodgame, supra note 9, at 504.
108. See id. at 503 (noting that GulfTerra’s “Independence Initiatives,” which was
intended to distinguish itself from sponsor El Paso Corporation, occurred shortly after “the
Enron debacle”).
109. See William W. Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76 TUL.
L. REV. 1275 (2002) (pointing out that the incentive structure of corporate governance
pervasive during the lead-up to the Enron bankruptcy failed to serve as a meaningful check
on management and needed overhaul).
110. See Goodgame, supra note 9, at 502 (asserting that investors will shy away from
MLPs viewed as favoring their sponsors over the interests of their common unitholders).
111. See Goodgame, supra note 21, at 87–88 (describing the November 2004 IPO of
Copano Energy, LLC).
112. Id. at 88.
113. Id. at 90.
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not provide for any minimum distributions or incentive-based
compensation for management.114 It may have been believed that by
making MLPs mirror the governance standards expected of corporations,
lenders and investors would view them more favorably for purposes of
extending capital. There are currently five traded LLCs among publicly
traded energy partnerships.115
The next method of reducing the cost of capital through IDR
elimination emerged in 2007 when MarkWest Energy Partners, LP
purchased its general partner MarkWest Hydrocarbon, Inc. in a merger,
thereby collapsing the IDRs into the MLP.116 The resulting entity instituted
unitholder elections of the general partner’s board of directors and
cancelled the IDRs.117 Notably, the entities that have undergone these “GP
tuck-in” transactions have not adopted traditional corporate fiduciary duties
for their boards.118
Third, and recently attempted by four MLPs that went public in
2011-2012, an MLP may go public with variable distributions of all
“available cash” instead of a required minimum quarterly distribution.119
Though the entity still has a general partner who retains control, the general
partner has a non-economic interest and thus its sole incentive to pay out
and increase cash distributions “lies in the general partner’s and sponsor’s
ownership of common units that benefit and suffer alongside those owned
by the public.”120 Finally, and most unlikely, an MLP’s general partner
may eliminate its IDRs completely of its own accord.121
Conversely, many MLPs have maintained IDRs, but have utilized
creative methods in attempts to avert the strain that high splits can place on
the entity’s cost of capital. The first method is general partner
subsidization of acquisitions. This technique involves the general partner’s
unilateral decision to forgo its contractual IDR payments for a defined or
indefinite term so that an acquisition is adequately accretive to common
unitholders.122 Secondly, an MLP may amend its partnership agreement to
reduce its highest level IDR to 25% (i.e. 2% general partner units share &
114. See id. at 88 (noting that “the Copano board is incentivized — like the board of any
other public corporation — by its prospects for re-election.”).
115. WELLS FARGO MLP PRIMER, supra note 2.
116. Goodgame, supra note 21, at 91–93. See generally Carpenter, supra note 13
(discussing the GP tuck-in phenomenon).
117. Goodgame, supra note 21, at 92.
118. Id. at 93.
119. See id. at 95–97 (describing variable distribution MLPs).
120. Id. at 97.
121. See WELLS FARGO MLP PRIMER, supra note 2, at 96 (mentioning Enterprise
Product Partners which eliminated its IDR structure completely in 2010).
122. See id. at 100–01 (listing twenty-four general-partner-subsidized transactions
dating from November 2004–October 2013).
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23% IDR distribution). Enterprise Products Partners, LP was seemingly
the first MLP to make this move when the MLP’s general partner elected to
cap its distributive share at 25%, reducing it from the status-quo 50%
threshold under conventional IDRs.123 There has been speculation that a
growth in institutional investors in the MLP market may pressure a move
towards capping IDRs below their usual 50% share.124
The final method employed by MLPs to reduce cost of capital
while maintaining IDRs is the IDR reset option. It is believed that DCP
Midstream Partners, LP was the first MLP to adopt such a cost of capital
protection mechanism.125 According to Phillips 66 Partners’ Prospectus,
the rationale for utilizing this reset option is “in order to facilitate
acquisitions or internal growth projects that would otherwise not be
sufficiently accretive to cash distributions per common unit, taking into
account the existing levels of incentive distribution payments being made
to our general partner.”126 Embedded in the MLP’s partnership agreement,
the IDR reset option is typically exercisable by the general partner after
four consecutive quarters of distributions at the 48% IDR level (50% if
including the general partner’s 2% interest).127
Under the provisions of the reset, the new minimum quarterly
distribution will be the average of the two quarterly cash distributions
preceding the IDR reset election.128
Furthermore, the new target
distributions will represent 115%, 125%, and 150% of the reset minimum
quarterly distribution.129 As an example, assume the new minimum
quarterly distribution is $1.00. Therefore, the first target distribution would
be $1.15 (115% of $1.00), the second target distribution would be $1.25
(125% of $1.00), and the third target distribution would be $1.50 (150% of
$1.00). Just like the first IDR iteration, the general partner would roughly
receive 2% of distributions less than or equal to $1.15, 15% of the cash
123. See Goodgame, supra note 9, at 504 (including an explanation of the decision to
cap its distribution made by Enterprise’s CEO in which he referenced a reduced “cash cost
of capital, which should enable us to provide our limited partners with greater economic
returns on capital investments”).
124. Id. at 505; see also Goodgame, supra note 21, at 98 (stating that institutional
investors owned approximately 31% of all outstanding MLP equity as of March 21, 2012).
125. See DCP Midstream Partners, LP, Prospectus (Form 424B4), at 61–63 (Dec. 2,
2005) [hereinafter DCP Midstream Prospectus] (describing DCP Midstream Partners’ IPO
and the general partner’s right to reset the IDRs and the general partner’s compensation
resulting from the reset).
126. Phillips 66 Prospectus, supra note 44, at 65.
127. See id. (stipulating that this right inures to the general partner as the holder of the
IDRs and is not subject to approval by “our unitholders or the conflicts committee”).
128. See id. at 66 (“[f]ollowing a reset election, the minimum quarterly distribution
amount will be reset to an amount equal to the average cash distribution amount per
common unit for the two fiscal quarters immediately preceding the reset election”).
129. Id.
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distributions between $1.15 and $1.25, 25% of the distributions between
$1.25 and $1.50, and 50% of all distributions over $1.50.
However, unlike Enterprise Product Partners’ voluntary
elimination of IDRs, an IDR reset election does not occur without
contractual compensation to the general partner. A standard IDR reset
clause provides for the issuance of Class B common units to the general
partner as compensation as well as the issue of enough general partner
shares to maintain the general partner’s interest at 2%.130 These newlyissued common units will throw off cash equal to the average of the IDR
payments to the general partner in the two previous quarters.131 Therefore,
the number of Class B common units the general partner receives will be
the average quarterly IDR payments divided by the average quarterly cash
distribution to the common units — both numbers being an average of the
two preceding quarters.132 For example, if the general partner received an
average of $5 million per quarter stemming from its IDR ownership and the
average cash distribution per common unit was $.50, the number of Class B
common units the general partner would receive for the reset would be ten
million ($5 million divided by $.50). Often times, these Class B units are
convertible to common units after a defined period of time, typically one
year.133 Though this compensation is clearly dilutive of the common
unitholders, a general partner is likely to exercise this reset only if doing so
facilitates growth for the MLP through a substantially accretive investment
that will increase the cash distribution to the common unitholders in both
the short- and long-term. It is important to realize that the reset does not
change the immediate cash flow to the general partner, but rather reduces
the future cash flows, which affect future distributions.134
The maintenance of IDRs with situational modifications to
accommodate accretive acquisitions is a persuasive mechanism for MLPs
in that the interests of general partners (i.e., parent-sponsors) and limited
partners are economically aligned. This conceptual framework aligns itself
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. See DCP Midstream Prospectus, supra note 125, at 62 (providing that “[e]ach
Class B unit will be convertible into one common unit at the election of the holder of the
Class B unit at any time following the first anniversary of the issuance of these Class B
units.”).
134. See WELLS FARGO MLP PRIMER, supra note 2, at 101 (stating that “the GP would
receive a lower percentage of incremental cash flow at the reset (higher) MQD than the 50%
of incremental cash flow that it would receive under the initial distribution schedule. Hence,
by resetting the incentive distribution tiers, the MLP’s cost of equity is effectively
reduced.”). For a detailed accounting depiction of an IDR reset, see EVEP and the IDR
Reset, MLP PROTOCOL, http://mlpprotocol.files.wordpress.com/2011/11/evep-and-the-idrreset.pdf.
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with “contractarian” legal scholarship, which aimed to undermine the
widely-held belief that the corporate form was the ideal entity type for
large firms. In the context of MLPs, which have successfully operated
under contractual constraints rather than corporate law frameworks for over
twenty-five years, a theory favoring “uncorporation” seems not only
plausible, but preferable.135
C. Theory of Uncorporation Manifested in Conventional MLP
The late legal scholar Larry Ribstein defined “uncorporate”
business as including partnerships and LLCs.136 Ribstein witnessed
firsthand the advent of publicly traded “uncorporate” entities — namely
partnerships like MLPs and private equity firms. In advocating for these
entities’ viability and optimality for certain large firms, he identified three
key aspects of “uncorporate” entities that made them adequate substitutes
for, if not better than, C corporations with respect to “fiduciary duties and
other traditionally corporate mechanisms for ensuring managerial
accountability.”137 These three aspects are: (1) mandatory distributions;
(2) managers as partners; and (3) limited duration followed by mandatory
liquidation.138 Simply put, these features should operate to reduce agency
costs associated with “ineffective corporate-type monitoring devices.”139
MLPs commonly exhibit two of these traits: mandatory distributions and
managers as partners. Considering that many of the largest MLPs are
composed of primarily midstream assets (e.g., pipelines) and have IDRs, an
argument exists that these “uncorporate” facets are a contributing factor to
MLPs’ tremendous performance compared with the market. By way of
example, a comparison of return on investment between Alerian’s MLP
Index (AMZ) and the S&P 500 was conclusively in MLP’s favor.140 AMZ
experienced an annualized return of 15% compared with S&P’s 7.4% over
the last ten years and an investment of $1000 would have grown to $4058
with AMZ compared with $2043 with S&P.141

135. See supra note 8 and accompanying text (listing four articles written by Ribstein).
136. Ribstein, Uncorporation, supra note 8, at 125.
137. See Ribstein, Partnership Governance, supra note 8, at 290–92 (comparing
corporations and partnerships with respect to distributions, liquidation, and manager
ownership in the firm); see also Manesh, supra note 84, at 564 (identifying three
uncorporate governance devices from Ribstein’s book “Rise of the Uncorporation”).
138. Manesh, supra note 84, at 564.
139. Ribstein, Partnership Governance, supra note 8, at 290.
140. See Alerian MLP Index Fact Sheet, ALERIAN, http://www.alerian.com/wpcontent/uploads/AMZfacts.pdf (last visited Mar. 21, 2014) (comparing Alerian’s index of
fifty prominent MLPs with the return on other investment vehicles available in the market).
141. Id.
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The first “uncorporate” aspect prominent amongst MLPs is the
existence of mandatory distributions, or, in more appropriate terminology,
required distribution of all “available cash.”142 Conceptually, limiting the
discretion managers have to retain earnings reduces the need to monitor
managers’ use of “free cash flow.”143 In MLPs, “free cash flow” is more or
less defined as “available cash,” which must be distributed to unitholders.
The discretion that MLP managers have to retain cash for capital
expenditure purposes is patently different from the same determination
made by a corporate board. MLP managers, often appointed by the general
partner who is controlled by the MLP’s sponsor, are incentivized to
distribute as much as possible due to the IDRs that serve to enhance the
general partner/sponsor’s share of cash flow. As a result, managers of
MLPs invariably do not have sufficient cash on hand to fund accretive
acquisitions, which forces them to seek investment from the capital
markets.144 Therefore, the theory follows that an efficient capital market
will serve as a monitor for MLP management and will impute higher costs
of capital for management inefficiencies.
The effect of “compelled distributions” has been attacked as
“dubious” since MLP managers have the discretion to determine what
constitutes “available cash.”145 It is alleged that the implication of
discretion is inescapably contradictory to mandatory distributions.146 Yet in
the same vein, it is conceded that IDRs create an incentive to maximize
these “compelled distributions,” but also create perverse incentives to
“aggressively increase distributions” and in doing so “driv[e] the firm to
riskier investments and acquisitions” at the expense of “prudently retaining
earnings and managing distributions to maximize long-term value.”147 In
the first instance, managerial discretion is the evil, and in the second, the
absence of managerial discretion is the shortcoming to mandatory
distributions. How can it be both? Rather, what is missing is the
understanding that though many MLPs are vehicles for growth and have an
142. See supra notes 43-50 and accompanying text (describing minimum quarterly
distributions and MLPs’ contractual mandate to distribute all available cash); see also supra
note 8 and accompanying text (unveiling Ribstein’s thesis of uncorporation).
143. Ribstein, Partnership Governance, supra note 8, at 290; cf. Michael C. Jensen,
Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers, 76 AM. ECON. REV.
(Papers & Proc.) 323 (1986) (defining free cash flow and suggesting the use of debt to
eliminate agency issues arising from managers’ misuse of free cash flow).
144. Manesh, supra note 84, at 565; see Ribstein, Uncorporation, supra note 8, at 128
(“Unlike corporate managers, uncorporation managers cannot rely on a permanent cache of
equity capital to fund their ventures. Their need to keep seeking funding ensures that their
activities will be continually monitored by the capital markets.”).
145. Manesh, supra note 84, at 590.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 591.
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incessant need for capital, they are nevertheless “low-growth firms”148 in
that they are often invested in fixed-fee, “steady cash flow” assets like
pipelines rather than more speculative, exploration and production assets.149
This characteristic of most MLPs makes their depiction as risky
investments more dubious because the entity is not likely to make the
investments absent near assurance that its cash flow will generate sufficient
cash to justify the cost of capital.150 Finally, to the extent that the general
partner (owned by the sponsor) derives economic benefit from mandatory
distributions, the limited partners will benefit in kind with greater
investment return — the economic interests of the parties are inescapably
intertwined, incentivizing efficient management.
MLP management is further connected to the financial
performance of the entity through its ownership of partnership units — the
second facet of uncorporate entities. Many MLPs are constructed such that
the general partner has a 2% equity interest, which is small in comparison
to their control over the entity. However, it is important to recall that when
an MLP goes public, the vast majority of the common units authorized are
kept by the sponsor and are defined as subordinated units, playing second
fiddle to the common unitholders’ minimum quarterly distributions.151
Therefore, in addition to the IDRs, an MLP’s parent/sponsor shares in the
plight of the limited partners, exposing them to “the same upside potential
and downside risks as their investors.”152
Interestingly, several MLPs employ the sponsored MLP model, but
lack IDRs or general partner equity interests. However, the common bond
they share is that their parent/sponsor maintains ownership of a large block
of limited partner interests such that it is aligned with the common
unitholders’ interests. Enterprise Products Partners is the chief of these as
the largest MLP by market capitalization. Its parent/sponsor, Enterprise
Products Company and its affiliates, own 36.4% of the limited partner
interests in the MLP as of December 31, 2013.153 Simply put, the general
partner is unlikely to engage in conduct that would sufficiently harm the
148. See Ribstein, Uncorporation, supra note 8, at 128 (“This uncorporate device is
better suited to mature, low-growth firms, which can set specific financial targets and timeframes.”)
149. See Goodgame, supra note 9, at 502 (“[A]ssets typically owned or acquired by
MLPs are ‘steady cash flow’-type assets and not more speculative, high-growth-type
assets”)(footnote omitted).
150. Id.
151. Peacock, supra note 20 at 401 (“It is not unusual for the parent/sponsor to initially
sell only a small portion (15-20%) of the total limited partner interests in the initial public
offering and retain the rest.”); see supra note 38 and accompanying text (explaining that
MLPs normally act as holding companies for “subsidiar[y]” LLCs, which own the assets.).
152. Manesh, supra note 84, at 565.
153. Enter. Prods. Partners, Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 1 (Mar. 3, 2014).
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economic status of the limited partners considering its stake as the sponsor.
Considering the sponsor’s significant investment in the MLP, a “selldown” — an abrupt sale of a large holding of units into the market — by
the sponsor could result in a significant drop in the value of the common
units as the sponsor and MLP’s interests become less aligned.154
The effect of mandatory distributions and manager ownership of
the partner interests seem to serve as an excellent check on MLP
management, ensuring the best investment outcome for common
unitholders. When general partners/sponsors and common unitholders
have the same skin in the game, both parties can end up as winners. The
uncorporate entity embodied in MLPs supports this mutualistic
relationship, as MLPs fare well in the market for investors and sponsors are
able to monetize assets and generate steady cash flow for their role in
aiding MLPs’ accretive growth.
CONCLUSION
Most recently, Kinder Morgan has added to the confusion over
whether sponsored MLPs are viable long-term through its $70 billion
reorganization, which folded its two MLPs into the “parent” C
corporation.155 The reasons proffered for the extensive restructuring were
the MLPs’ prohibitively high costs of capital and the need to lower the cost
of capital to pursue more investments.156 It is possible that the Kinder
Morgan consolidation will touch off a chain reaction of corporations
acquiring the MLPs that they have developed through dropdowns. The
market response to Kinder’s consolidation has been largely positive thus
far, though at the expense of the old MLPs’ unitholders, which were hit
with a large tax bill as result of the deal.157 Though Kinder has removed
itself from the MLP arena with this deal, it remains to be seen whether it
will form MLPs in the future as it is now holding a plethora of qualifyingincome assets. It would not be surprising to see Kinder drop new MLPs in
the future to combat rising costs of capital at the corporate level, which is
arguably the rationale for forming MLPs in the first place.158
154. Goodgame, supra note 21, at 94.
155. Brian Nelson, Kinder Morgan Consolidation: Not for the Reasons You Think,
SEEKING ALPHA, http://seekingalpha.com/article/2517775-kinder-morgan-consolidation-notfor-the-reasons-you-think.
156. Id.
157. Laura Saunders, The Bill Comes Due on Kinder Morgan MLPs, WALL ST. J., Aug.
29, 2014, http://online.wsj.com/articles/the-tax-bill-comes-due-on-kinder-morgan-mlps1409335312.
158. See discussion supra Part I.B (asserting that C corporations may utilize MLP
dropdowns as a method of capitalizing the corporation at a discount compared with the cost
of capital otherwise available to the corporation through the capital markets).
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MLP governance is clearly going through a significant period of
experimentation and flux as sponsors seek the best method to monetize
their qualifying income-producing assets while still making the entity
sufficiently accretive to prospective limited partners. The maintenance of
economic incentives improves the lot of both sponsors and common
unitholders in that sponsors are encouraged to drop down assets that will be
accretive long-term to the common unitholders in exchange for capital to
reinvest elsewhere and a share of the assets’ future cash flows (i.e., IDRs).
Though high-split IDRs are an unquestionable detriment to cost of
capital, it is also clear that IDRs, if managed and restricted, can continue to
be a boon to MLPs. The IDR reset mechanism provides a method that
compensates a general partner with further equity immediately in exchange
for a smaller share of future cash flows, thereby reducing the cost of equity
capital. It has arguably become a best practice to include an IDR reset
provision in MLPs' partnership agreements if the MLP utilizes IDRs to
incentivize the general partner. Flexibility for the general partner to
decrease the cost of capital is not an evil for equity holders since the two
parties are economically bound at the hip. Furthermore, so long as MLP
common unitholders continue to see market-besting returns, it is doubtful
that they will look the gift horse that is sponsored MLP model governance
in the mouth.

